There are few more polarizing terms, concepts more emotionally and viscerally motivating than that of “terrorism.” Much like the “Nazi”, “racist”, or “bigot” moniker popular today, or perhaps the “Communist” label during the Cold War, the label of “terrorist” is one that immediately discredits and tends to quickly disqualify an individual or group from any possible objective analysis. And there is no shortage of its use today, whether rightly or incorrectly, as a “thought terminating cliche”, a sort of final identifier that can determine guilt without any semblance of a fair trial.
Even more evocative, though, is the practice of suicide terrorism. Often far more bold and destructive than traditional terrorism, like sending letters laced with anthrax, package bombs, or booby traps, for instance, the very act of suicide terror attracts far more attention and concern. The vast majority of security and the function and flow of our everyday lives simply assumes that self-preservation is the ultimate influencing factor in whether one commits violence against others. When one is willing to forego any concern for their own wellbeing, almost no amount of precaution is sufficient or feasible to protect against it.
So what, then, would motivate someone to go to such lengths to commit acts of suicide terror? The blanket answer for many Americans is Islam. Since most, if not all, occurrences of suicide terror that the average American is aware of have been committed by seemingly dedicated Muslims, it is a simple conclusion to draw. And because these acts typically result in no living suspects, it is impossible to find out, after the fact, what their motivations were. But is this conclusion borne from the data? Or is it a convenient myth that misses a much more profound truth about the reasoning behind acts of suicide terror?
What Can the Data Tell Us?
Fortunately, we do have tools with which to study suicide terror. One important tool is statistical analysis. It is a simple enough task to compile lists of occurrences of suicide terror and an equally simple, though more time consuming, task to compare them with each other to see what, if any, trends can be observed within the data.
One particular effort of great note is the work of Robert Pape. Through analyzing suicide terror from the early ’80s through 2003, Pape was able to bring clarity to the phenomena that is suicide terror through categorizing its sources, motivations, and the environment in which it was born and committed. His conclusions are extremely important and, not surprisingly, mesh well with libertarian philosophy.
The Strategic Factors that Contribute to Suicide Terror
A familiar refrain can often be heard within libertarian circles when discussing issues of foreign policy, humanitarian interventionism, and terrorism, and that is the concept of “blowback.” Libertarians are often rebutted by those who either favor particular military or interventionary action worldwide or by those who are thoroughly committed to the concept of Islam as an always-violent, always-backward force behind most, if not all, violence between Muslims and the West.
But some interesting, yet not surprising, trends begin to show themselves in the data upon analysis. Those trends distill into a conclusion that goes something like this, that:
The purpose of suicide terror is to influence democratic targets to cease occupation of their national homeland.
That conclusion is certainly a rather pregnant one and requires some further breakdown.
Why Democracies?
Let us first consider the targeting of democracies. Pape lists some general patterns that are found across suicide terror during the studied time period, one of which is the matter of target selection. Pape summarizes this trend, stating that “all suicide terrorist campaigns in the last two decades have been aimed at democracies.”
Upon some reflection, it is not too difficult to understand why this might be the case. While libertarians are skeptical that democratic forms of government do a good job of reflecting the actual will and representation of the people, this is certainly the common assumption. Democracies and their actions are perceived as acting on behalf of and with the approval of those they represent. And while it may be much more difficult to sway political leaders’ opinions, public support for state actions are still important for political success and re-election. Compared to other political forms like monarchies or dictatorships, democracies are infinitely more rational targets.
Random Acts of Violence?
The matter of timing for suicide campaigns is also important. Pape concludes that “nearly all suicide attacks occur in organized, coherent campaigns, not as isolated or randomly timed incidents.”
When we look at the actual list of attacks, this trend does, indeed, seem to play out. Of 315 total incidents, only a handful of attacks were not obviously part of an organized campaign. The remainder are grouped into very small timeframes that show organized, purposeful campaigns.
Take, for instance, a statement made by Mahmud al-Zahar, a leader of Hamas during the mid-90’s: “We must calculate the benefit and cost of continued armed operations. If we can fulfill our goals without violence, we will do so. Violence is a means, not a goal.” Whether one agrees with those goals is one matter. But the logic shown here indicates a methodology that few are aware of or recognize when they attempt to understand what drives groups like Hamas to commit the acts that they do.
A National Focus
Nationalism also plays an important role as included above. Pape concludes that the data indeed shows that “every suicide campaign from 1980 to 2003 has had as a major objective…coercing a foreign government that has military forces in what they see as their homeland to take those forces out.”This is not a surprising conclusion to draw after surveying the data. Each group listed, at least at the time of their respective campaigns, represents a distinct regional or national interest, for example, Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, Hamas in Palestinian occupied terrorities, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, and so forth.
The main focus of this article is in breaking the common consensus of a very vague and wooden cause for modern terrorism and, as such, there are other aspects and trends that deserve further discussion. But a couple of additional points are particularly poignant here. The first is that there is some distinction worth making between what may be called a “suicide mission” versus an act of “suicide terror.” An individual or group embarking on a destructive rampage that is almost sure to result in their being killed during the act, though similar in outcome, is not subject to the same sort of motivation and justification.
The second is that, purely looking at the data from a religious perspective, the conclusion that Islam is unique in its ability to motivate towards or its allowance of suicide terrorism is certainly not a determinative one. A great many suicide terror campaigns have been carried out by groups with secular or other religious affiliations. This may not, by itself, disqualify religious motivation as a factor or facilitator for terror activity. However, given the much farther reaching principles explained above, it does show how little explanatory power such a motivation has in explaining suicide terror as a phenomenon.
Some Case Studies
In order to truly bring some tangibility to the theory and statistical analysis above, it would be helpful to see some representative examples of the this theory borne out by applying them to some particular suicide terror groups/campaigns to see if and how they apply. Of some particular applicability to Americans, those of Lebanese Hezbollah and Al Qaeda should be illustrative.
Lebanese Hezbollah
The case of Hezbollah is particularly important in understanding the phenomenon of suicide terrorism. Before the 1980’s, apart from very sporadic occasions, suicide terrorism was basically non-existent. This is particularly important to note as the impression that Islamic fundamentalism is the central motivation for suicide terrorism does not fit this historical data point. Islam, along with varying degrees and regions of fundamentalist influence, has been more or less a constant factor for 1400 years while suicide terrorism has been a reality for less than 40.
Many are familiar with the involvement of Hezbollah regarding the Khobar Towers bombing in Beirut in 1983 but few are familiar with the group’s origination, its other actions, or the environment within which it operated. Hezbollah’s terrorism campaigns are clearly situated from 1982 to 1986 in which they conducted 36 attacks including 41 attackers. Hezbollah was formed as a reaction to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon and their subsequent occupation. Since 1985, while Israel gradually removed their forces, Hezbollah continues to exist as a political and military entity in southern Lebanon.
How well can we apply Pape’s thesis to Hezbollah’s suicide campaigns? For one, these attacks were carried out against American, French, and Israeli targets. All three parties involved at least claim to function as modern democracies so the proposed targeting consistency certainly holds true here. As well, the timeframe of the campaigns, from 1982-1986, closely aligns with the bulk of occupation by the US, France, and Israel. More importantly, notice that, though Hezbollah still exists while any of its broad religious demographic makeup has not significantly changed, its suicide terror activity ceased long ago. This contradicts any notion that Hezbollah’s identification as a predominantly Shia or Islamic group somehow determines its primary terror motivation. A quick look at those that actually carried out the attacks is also very illustrative: Out of the 41 attackers, 27 were communist or socialist, 3 were Christians, and only 8 can successfully be shown to be even affiliated with fundamentalist Islam. This demographic makeup certainly does not fit such a narrative.
Some firsthand statements from those who led and participated in Hezbollah at the time are also very telling. For instance, Sheikh Nasrallah, then general secretary, stated regarding the origin of Hezbollah, that “the [Israeli] invasion accelerated its existence, and Hezbollah was born as a resistance force in the reaction to the occupation…Hezbollah was at its inception centered on resisting the occupation, nothing else…” One Sunni teen attacker who issued a statement regarding her motives recalled, “I have witnessed the calamity of my people under occupation. With total calmness I shall carry out an attack of my choice hoping to kill the largest number of the Israeli army.” Whether one approves of their actions, we must reasonably conclude that the history of Hezbollah suicide campaigns is not rooted in irrational, Islamic fundamentalism but follows from a particular strategic logic.
Al Qaeda
The scope of activity and relevant factors of suicide terror in the case of Al Qaeda is certainly larger than that of other groups like Hezbollah. It indeed begins with Osama Bin Laden who traces his roots of militancy to his involvement in the Afghan/Islamic resistance to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in the ’80s. For those already familiar with Bin Laden’s life, this episode is a very telling one and establishes much of Al Qaeda’s broad strategy throughout its existence. The example set by Hezbollah in Lebanon, that of successful concessions gained by suicide terror, along with the example in Afghanistan of guerrilla resistance successfully forcing the withdrawal of a global superpower, provided much of the strategic undergirding behind Al Qaeda’s actions.
Al Qaeda’s root of existence dates to the establishment of US military bases within Saudi Arabia and their use as launching points for various Middle Eastern operations, such as Operation Desert Storm and its enforcement of sanctions against Iraq in the ’90s. These reasons have always been clear and explicit. For instance, Bin Laden clearly stated three such factors in his 1998 “Declaration of War Against Jews and Crusaders”: In short, the first, that “the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula”, the second, that “despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded one million…the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres”, and third, “their eagerness to destroy Iraq…and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the region into paper statelets.”
Bin Laden’s reasoning clearly hits upon many of the factors that we have theorized explains the phenonmenon of suicide terror. The occupation by the US of nations such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and their alliance with Israel in much of the same, is front and center. The US and Israel also qualify as democracies for the sake of this argument. And while the rhetoric in statements issued by Bin Laden are perhaps more suffused with apparent religious terminology and themes, the core reasoning is rational and factual.
There are some interesting departures from other, simpler examples present in this case. For one, Al Qaeda as a group represents a larger identity than one, singular region or nationality; a transnational group, if you will. However, there are sufficient factors to help root this reality back to the core theoretical explanation. As noted above, the emphasis on national identity within the motivations behind its declaration of hostilities is apparent, with its explicit mention of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, etc.
As well, Islamic fundamentalism does play a larger role, at least in Al Qaeda’s demographics of recruitment. For instance, Al Qaeda suicide terrorists are two times as likely to hail from Muslim countries with Islamic fundamentalist influence compared with those without it. However, that trend pales in comparison to the fact that they are ten times more likely to come from countries where there is an American military presence, and when those factors are combined, they provide an even greater causal correlation. As Pape suggests, “Al Qaeda is less a transnational network of like-minded ideologues brought together from across the globe…than a cross-national military alliance of national liberation movements working together against what they see as a common imperial threat.” Additionally, it is interesting to note that, in contrast with Al Qaeda’s Sunni Islamic affiliation, “no follower of Iranian or Iraqi Shiism has ever become an Al Qaeda suicide terrorist.”
A thorough explanation of the differences between types of Islamic affiliation and influence is not in scope here. Al Qaeda certainly represents a more enigmatic case when compared to more singular, simplified groups. And the particular influence of Salafist or Wahhabist Sunni Islam is certainly a factor in at least providing cohesion and a broader coalition of otherwise disparate groups. But when it comes to actual suicide terror activity and its justification, common perception simply doesn’t match reality: that, even in the case of Al Qaeda, blatant occupation, with all that it often entails, provides much more explanatory power than does conventional wisdom.
The Bottom Line
The libertarian often finds themself in a position that can be described as “defending the undefendable.” To many, the above may be perceived as justifying, even glorifying those that commit suicide terror or attack servicemen or civilians. But one can understand and even empathize with individuals who commit acts of violence without also approving of those acts. My ultimate intention is only that simple, rote explanations for acts of terrorism may be viewed more skeptically and that, through that understanding, such acts may be prevented in the future.