We’re still moving along in our series on the Six Day War, arriving closer and closer along the timeline of events to the actual outbreak of the war. In previous installments, we looked at just how relations between Israel and the various actors in the region, from Egypt to Syria to Jordan, degraded to the point that they had. And we also looked at a few of the justifications given for Israel’s strike against Egypt, mainly the militarization of the Sinai Peninsula and the closing of the Straits of Tiran.
But there were other factors at play that directly flavored the actions and reactions of those in the region at the time. Next, we will review the situations in Jordan and Syria just prior to the war and also consider Israel’s ultimate intentions, whether the war was indeed one of last resort with no other, more malicious, motives.
Jordan and Israel’s Ultimate Intentions
It is often portrayed that the Six Day War was purely an act of desperation, a war of no choice, one that was not desired but required in the face of Arab aggression. Abba Eban, noted Israeli diplomat, opined at the time that, “The choice was to live or perish, to defend the national existence or to forfeit it for all time.” The Israeli Cabinet decision regarding the preemptive strike noted that, “the Government ascertained that the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan are deployed for immediate multi-front aggression, threatening the very existence of the state,” and then Prime Ministor Levi Eshkol testified that “the existence of the state…hung in the balance.” This sort of framing of the situation certainly does imply that Israel was an innocent David among Arab Goliaths.
But in order for this to be true, we would want to be certain of a couple of important pre-requisites. We would want to ensure that the Israeli actions did appear to be in reaction to actual Arab provocation at the time. We would want to ensure that the Arab threat did, indeed, pose a legitimate military risk to Israeli defense. And we would want to see evidence that Israeli motives were relatively pure, ones of defense and self-preservation rather than dominance and conquest.
Once again, in analyzing these motives, we must return, briefly, to events two decades earlier in 1948. As we mentioned briefly in our installment on Jordan, Israel and Jordanian leadership possessed a slightly more courteous relationship than that between Egypt or Syria. As part of an agreement to limit Jordanian involvement in the Israeli war of independence, Israel agreed to allow Jordan to annex portions of Palestinian territory in the West Bank. However, for those familiar with the geographic extent of the original, historic “Promised Land,” this left a large portion of desirable Jewish homeland unpossessed. David Ben-Gurion himself described this tragic yet then-necessary condition as “bechiya ledorot” in Hebrew, “a fatal historical mistake” or “a lamentation for generations.” Just previous to the outbreak of the war, Yigal Allon published an article considering, “In … a new war, we must avoid the historic mistake of the War of Independence [1948] … and must not cease fighting until we achieve total victory, the territorial fulfilment of the Land of Israel.”
It’s worth noting here, then, that both Jordan and Israel seemed largely unconcerned with the property rights or self-determination of the Palestinians in the West Bank. There is, of course, quite a notable difference between how Israel and Jordan handled those Palestinians living in the West Bank; while Jordan annexed the West Bank and assimilated the Palestinians quite thoroughly, extending them Jordanian citizenship, it was always planned to at least delay if not perpetually prevent Palestinians from assimilating into Israel. This had long factored into reasoning for not previously attempting the takeover of the West Bank: “[Ben-Gurion] told them about the danger of incorporating one million Arabs into a state that has a population of one and three quarter million.” But regardless of their treatment or intentions, the attitude toward Palestinian sovereignty was the same: whether the West Bank “belonged” to Israel or Jordan, it certainly did not belong to the Palestinians.
Along with the sense of missed destiny in 1948 came a keen eye toward looking for another convenient opportunity that would justify Israeli possession of the West Bank and other unclaimed territory as part of the historic Land of Israel. Sections of the Israeli political ruling class had planned attempts to execute such a takeover but those plans were aborted due to political factors. As Benny Morris surmises, “Activists such as Dayan periodically toyed with the idea of expanding Israel’s borders, at least eastward to the Jordan, to give the country strategic depth and more logical, natural, and defensible frontiers. Occasionally during 1954–56 Ben-Gurion, Dayan, and Lavon also proposed conquering the Golan Heights, southern Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, or parts of Sinai.” Those proposals were aborted in 1958 and 1960 due to fear of international reaction and the aforementioned demographic factors that such a conquest might entail.
Recall briefly that, in November of 1966, Israel had embarked on a massive raid in the village of Samu in the West Bank. This event catalyzed Jordan’s response and a massive reprisal of opinion among the surrounding arab countries. Patrick Seale considers that, “by its raid on Samu, Israel, as it no doubt calculated, sharpened Arab divisions, radicalized opinion, and set its lamentably weak and hopelessly quarrelsome neighbors lurching amid mutual plots and accusations, to the very edge of the precipice.” The criticism then launched by Hussein against Egypt then led to the Egyptian actions noted in the previous installment in this series, that of the expulsion of UNEF from the Egyptian/Sinai border.
But Jordan ultimately found itself between a rock and a hard place just before the outbreak of war. The joint pact between Jordan, Syria, and Egypt stipulated that Jordan was obliged to enter the war as soon as Egypt was attacked. However, similar to 1948, King Hussein offered an assurance to Israel that, “if war began he would have to do something, but that it would be short and would not entail a real war.” Jordan feared that, even if they “did not participate directly in a war that was started by Israel it would not only be destroyed by the Arab world and even blamed for the loss of the war but our turn would be next.”
And, so, the threat of war crept on and that very edge of the precipice was being approached in nearby Syria as well.
The Syrian Invasion Threat
This brings us to April, 1967, to the Syrian-Israeli border. As we have noted earlier in this series, a number of escalating tit-for-tat conflicts continuously found the DMZs along the border in a state of violence. That escalation eventually involved more grand displays than simply insurgency and culminated in the April skirmish between the Syrian and Israeli air forces, resulting in six Syrian planes being shot down, one over Damascus itself.
That following May, Syrian-Israeli relations became increasingly strained and what followed is a rather controversial series of events that form much of the bedrock of controversy regarding blame for the war itself.
State officials and media outlets began reporting on a series of what were perceived to be threats of an impending Syrian invasion. General Yitzak Rabin, the Israeli chief of staff, allegedly issued a threat over Israeli radio, stating that “the moment is coming when we will march on Damascus to overthrow the Syrian government.” This pointed threat itself is disputed by some and has become a sore spot in historiography of the time. He did, however, indeed say that, “The type of reaction adopted against Jordan and Lebanon is applicable only against states that do not favor the acts of sabotage mounted from their territory.… In Syria the problem is different, because the government activates the saboteurs. Therefore the objective of the action in Syria is different.” This was in reference to the apparent lack of Palestianian support in Jordan and Lebanon contrasted with the more formal support offered by both Egypt and Syria in arming certain Palestinian groups.
However, whether the statement was made in this direct language or not, there were a number of signs that pointed to a similar conclusion. For instance, then Prime Minister Levi Eshkol threatened that Israel “may have to teach Syria a sharper lesson,” and that, “In view of the 14 [border] incidents in the past month alone it is possible that we will have to adopt measures no less drastic than those of April 7.”
The Israeli chief of military intelligence, General Aharon Yariv, spoke of a “military action of great size and strength.” Newspapers like the New York Times and Jerusalem Post received information that “some Israeli leaders have decided that the use of force against Syria may be the only way to curtail increasing terrorism. … This has become apparent in talks with highly qualified and informed Israelis,” and that “a major military clash with Syria seemed inevitable.” This same general commented to another outlet that, “Israel would take limited military action designed to topple the Damascus army regime if Syrian terrorists continued sabotage raids inside Israel. It would be a telling blow against the Syrian Government.” U Thant related that “rumors of an impending blow against Syria were current throughout Israel. … [T]hey reached Cairo and other Arab capitals, where they generated the belief that Israel was about to mount a massive attack on Syria. … Bellicose statements by Israeli leaders … created … panic in the Arab world,” and “could only heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the lines.”
This was also compounded by a Soviet missive in mid-May claiming that Israel was preparing an invasion force against Syria. Apparently, according to Benny Morris, “the Soviets spoke of ten to twelve IDF brigades and mentioned May 17 as the date set for the assault.” The particulars of this report seem to have been proven rather false. Odd Bull of the UN himself “had no reports of any build-up” from his observers, though he did mention that, “it has to be remembered that Israel had acquired an almost legendary ability to mobilize its forces and concentrate them at the right time and in the right place.” It appears that, apart from a small contingent of tank forces, Israel did not immediately amass anywhere near the proposed amount of its forces. But, given the statements emanating from Israeli officials at the time, Harold Saunders concludes that, “The Soviet advice to the Syrians that the Israelis were planning an attack was not far off, although they seemed to have exaggerated the magnitude. The Israelis were planning an attack – but not an invasion.”
Nevertheless, in the words of Richard Parker, “there were enough verifiable statements by Israeli leaders during the period in question to create an impression that they were about to take serious military action.” And it is upon this backdrop that the war eventually broke, though not in Syria but Egypt.
The Bottom Line
As you can see, the various actors, with their motivations and histories, made for quite the messy powder keg and backdrop for the eventual war. And, as you can imagine, given the name of the “Six Day War,” the actual events were quick and sometimes difficult to track. In the next installment, we will review the actual events of the war to give us a better picture of just how we ought to view the actions of all sides.