For those of us who have weathered the storm that is K-12 public education or have successfully completed an undergraduate degree, you’ve probably completed a course or two in American and/or world history through the 20th century. And if you are anything like me, your interest in history was not strong during those years and the overall narrative of the knowledge gained there can probably be summed up thusly: A string of named wars, a vague notion of why they started, how they ended, and some equally vague impression of what happened between them.
This phenomenon is undoubtedly true of the Cold War, America’s long power struggle with the Soviet Union lasting from roughly the end of World War II until the early ’90s. In many ways it is different; perhaps no other conflict between world powers has included so many proxies, allies, and enemies across so many regions of the world encompassing such a long time span. But it also bears telltale similarities. And while we cannot imagine an alternate reality in which the Cold War and its fingerprints on human history do not exist, its necessity was never a foregone conclusion.
Where Exactly Does the Cold War Begin?
Anyone remotely familiar with the details of the actors involved during World War II will recall that the Allied powers included the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union itself. Once assembled, the three global powers were able to forge an alliance of convenience but underlying their cooperation were distinct end-goals, some nobler than others and some ends nobler than their means. The US sought to establish an international world order that could possibly prevent yet more world wars in the future. Britain, predictable as ever, sought to maintain their empire to the greatest extent possible. And the Soviet Union above all sought to become a more secure state, buffered against conflict or invasion from Europe. This marked the second time that Germany had warred with Russia and there existed a long history of invasions on the western front throughout Russian history.
But with few direct conflicts in their desired outcomes after the war, why the soured relationship with the Soviets shortly after its end? It all begins with an end, the death of FDR to be precise. Throughout Roosevelt’s last years of his presidency and the later years of the war, his Vice President, Harry Truman, had either taken little interest or been allowed little information having anything to do with US foreign policy. He also had not possessed any foreknowledge regarding the existence or testing of the atomic bomb and this discovery quickly led to big changes in US-Soviet relations.
How Truman Learned to Love the Bomb
During the last allied conference held in Yalta, some key concessions and agreements were arranged. Stalin had agreed to enter the war in the Pacific with Japan three months after Germany was defeated on the western front and, in exchange, the US and Britain would agree to slice-and-dice Germany and Poland in an agreeable manner (much to the chagrin of the Polish people, I’m sure). But shortly after, FDR abruptly died and after succession had passed to Truman statecraft quickly began to shift. Truman relied heavily on the influence and ideas of James Byrnes.
Byrnes’ views were much more hawkish on Russia than his predecessors and he influenced Truman to pursue the testing and, eventually, use of the atomic bomb both to politically justify the cost of the program and as a show of force against Russia. (The program cost upwards of $2 billion dollars. It is also interesting to note that two types of bombs were produced during that time, one using plutonium, the other uranium, and one of each was used to bomb the Japanese) During the war, the US and Britain had exchanged knowledge of its development while excluding Stalin. With this information now known to Truman, and with Byrnes with him at the helm, the Yalta conference agreements began to fall apart; Truman and Byrnes jockeying to delay further conference until the weapons had been tested and Stalin could honor his agreement to join the war effort in Japan, and Stalin and the USSR maneuvering to have some political advantage in Polish governmental affairs.
Though Truman and Stalin kept up appearances and civility, upon hearing of successful nuclear tests back home, Truman quickly did an about face. The Soviet Union, originally slated to soon join in the Pacific campaign was told firsthand about a “new weapon of unusual destructive force” and Truman gloated privately that the “Japs will fold up before Russia comes in. I am sure they will when Manhattan appears over their homeland.” By the time Hiroshima lay in flames, America had sent an eager signal to Stalin and the world about US intentions.
The Bomb Changed Things Forever
The use of atomic weapons in the Pacific instantly and forever introduced a new disruption to the balance of power that is still felt today. In some circles within the State Department, there was a desire to possibly shift into a war against the Soviet Union itself after the Axis powers were defeated. And at the very least the bombing of Japan poised the US in a far more superior position in its relations with the USSR.
And the Soviet Union felt it. Though some knowledge of the actual state of the USSR during and after the war was lesser known at the time, the Soviets suffered greatly in their fight on the western front and were in no real position to threaten the US. During its conflict with Germany, the Nazi regime tore a swath of destruction wherever it went. It left more than 70,000 villages and 1,700 towns in ruins with twenty-five million Russians left refugees or homeless. The Nazis sent five million to concentration camps and wantonly killed upwards of seven million civilians with only nine million Germans killed. So it is no surprise that Stalin’s primary goal after the war was resolved was to re-stabilize his country and prevent destruction on this scale from ever occurring again.
The Soviet Union saw the atomic bomb moreso as “atomic blackmail against the USSR” and as a potential threat to “unleash a new, even more terrible and devastating war.” Generals and diplomats undertook tours of Eastern Europe and the Soviet bloc countries and found them devastated with rampant poverty and hunger. And there were some elements within those countries that began to seek out the Communist party to alleviate it. We actually know now that, despite what may have been assumed was Soviet interference with western European elections, Stalin had actually ordered his agents not to become involved so as to avoid provocation with the United States.
Even so, Washington’s dreams of a new democratic world order and Russia’s desire for control of regional influence in Eastern Europe remained an irreconcilable difference. But with little evidence of an aggressive Russia, reason for material escalation of US-Soviet relations was lacking. Motivation for what we now call Cold War hostility would have to come from a less factual source.
The Stage Is Set
After the war, things changed quickly within Truman’s cabinet. And these changes led to the rise of what are now many familiar figures in Cold War history. Among the notable were names like George Kennan, the head of the US embassy in Moscow, George Marshall, who succeeded the once trusty James Byrnes as Secretary of State who was then later replaced by Dean Acheson, and Paul Nitze, a war bureaucrat during World War II who was then appointed as a head of State Department policy planning.
By the late 1940’s, the Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic weapon and been party to some dramatic but short-lived regional episodes such as their blockade of Berlin. But the American people had more pressing concerns at hand. Recession was close at hand and very few Americans were concerned that the Soviet Union posed a threat that overrode domestic concerns.
Not surprisingly, as is common with military bureaucracy since the Cold War, those in power in Washington disagreed with those priorities. There was great concern about the possible spread of Communism throughout Europe and that if the USSR were able to unite such regional powers, it could pose a credible threat. What the possible solution should be, if any, was debatable within the cabinet but what was eventually decided is widely known. Washington unveiled the Truman Doctrine during a joint session of Congress in March of 1947 which laid out his intent to “support free people to work out their destinies in their own way.” As well, along with George Marshall, he then unveiled the Marshall Plan to fulfill that intent, offering economic aid to Europe in order to help rebuild after the war and to prevent the economic incentives that had pushed some European countries toward Communism.
The Lasting Legacy of NSC-68
Truman and his advisers found the ideological conflict between Washington and Moscow to be beneficial for political opinion. And after Russia’s successful testing of an atomic bomb, Truman ordered an updated national security review. For the hawkish within his cabinet, this was the opportunity they had hoped for.
National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) called for sweeping changes to military funding and established the framework for the vast array of intervention and conflict that now constitutes Cold War history. Leon Keyserling, then a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, supported the increase in military spending. Up until this time, fiscal conservatism had held sway in Congress but with the advent of Keynesian economic theory and the impending recession, Keyserling provided clout for the increase.
NSC-68 laid out the expectation of viewing every nation as either friend or foe, expanding what was before considered a more regional stage and scope of the US-Soviet relationship. In spite of lack of obvious concern of the Soviet threat in the public or government sphere, Nitze and Acheson systematically manipulated the various executive offices for their support and by the time that it arrived on Truman’s desk, it was almost impossible for him to refuse to approve it. It called for a tripling of the current military budget and eventually sent it soaring from thirteen billion to sixty-nine billion in 1951 and to fifty-six billion soon after. And it did not take long for the US to experience its fruits as war broke out in Korea. NSC-68 firmly established the permanent Military-Industrial-Complex that we experience today and its legacy can be easily seen decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse.
The Bottom Line
Anytime that I think I have a decent grasp on real American history, it never fails that I soon after learn something equally shocking. It is no wonder that the Cold War setting has forever been etched upon American minds and popular culture. But even amongst the swaths of fictional books and films that hearken back to that age, the real, historical accounts continue to be just as dramatic and, indeed, stranger than fiction.